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In the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH) intelligent but fallible investors learn 
from and adapt to changing economic environments.  This implies that markets 
are not always efficient, but are usually competitive and adaptive, varying in their 
degree of efficiency as the environment and investor population change over time.  
The AMH has several implications including the possibility of negative risk 
premia, alpha converging to beta, and the importance of macro factors and risk 
budgeting in asset-allocation policies. 
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Introduction 
In the wake of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, investors, financial advisors, portfolio 
managers, and regulators are still at a loss as to how to make sense of its repercussions and 
where to turn for guidance.  The traditional paradigms of modern portfolio theory and the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) seem woefully inadequate but simply acknowledging that 
investor behavior may be irrational is small comfort to individuals who must decide how to 
allocate their assets among increasingly erratic and uncertain investment alternatives.  The 
reason for this current state of confusion and its strange dynamics is straightforward: many 
market participants are now questioning the broad framework in which their financial decisions 
are being made.  Without a clear and credible narrative of what happened, how it happened, why 
it happened, whether it can happen again, and what to do about it, their only response is to react 
instinctively to the most current crisis, which is a sure recipe for financial ruin. 
In this article, I describe how the “Adaptive Markets Hypothesis”—an alternative to the 
EMH that reconciles the apparent contradiction between behavioral biases and the difficulty of 
outperforming passive investment vehicles—can make sense of both the current market turmoil 
as well as the emergence and popularity of the EMH in the decades leading up to the recent 
crisis.  Contrary to current popular sentiment, the EMH is not wrong; it is merely incomplete.  
Markets are well-behaved most of the time, but like any other human invention, they are not 
infallible, and they can break down from time to time for understandable and predictable reasons.  
By viewing financial markets and institutions from the perspective of evolutionary biology rather 
than physics,1
The Traditional Investment Paradigm 
 I believe we can construct a much deeper and more accurate narrative of how 
markets work and what we can do to prepare for their periodic failures. 
To understand the limitations of the traditional investment paradigm, consider its most 
common tenets: (1) there is a positive trade-off between risk and reward across all financial 
investments—assets with higher risk offer higher expected return; (2) this trade-off is linear, risk 
is best measured by equity “beta”, and excess returns are measured by “alpha”, the average 
                                                 
1 For the hazards of “physics envy” in finance, see Lo and Mueller (2010). 
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deviation of a portfolio’s return from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) benchmark; 
(3) reasonably attractive investment returns may be achieved by passive, long-only, highly 
diversified market-cap-weighted portfolios of equities, i.e., those containing only equity betas 
and no alpha; (4) strategic asset allocation among asset classes is the most important decision 
that an investor makes in selecting a portfolio best suited to his risk tolerance and long-run 
investment objectives; and (5) all investors should be holding stocks for the long run.  
Collectively, these five basic principles have become the foundation of the investment 
management industry, influencing virtually every product and service offered by professional 
portfolio managers, investment consultants, and financial advisors. 
Like all theories, these statements are meant to be approximations to a much more 
complex reality.  Their usefulness and accuracy depend on a number of implicit assumptions 
regarding the relationship between risk and reward, including: 
(A1) The relationship is linear; 
(A2) The relationship is static across time and circumstances; 
(A3) The relationship’s parameters can be accurately estimated; 
(A4) Investors have rational expectations; 
(A5) Asset returns are stationary, i.e., their joint distribution is constant over time; and 
(A6) Markets are efficient. 
Each of these assumptions can be challenged on theoretical, empirical, and experimental 
grounds, but all theories are, by definition, abstractions that involve simplifying assumptions.  
The relevant question is not whether these assumptions are literally true—they are not—but 
rather whether the approximation errors they generate are sufficiently small that they can be 
ignored for practical purposes.  I propose that the answer to this question has changed over the 
past decade.  From the mid-1930s to the mid-2000s—a period of relatively stable financial 
markets and regulations—these assumptions were reasonable approximations to U.S. financial 
markets.  However, the approximation errors have greatly increased in more recent years for 
reasons that we can identify, to the point where now they can no longer be ignored. 
Figure 1 provides a clear illustration of this perspective, in which the cumulative total 
return of the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-
weighted stock-market return index from January 1926 to December 2010 is plotted on a 
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logarithmic scale (so that the same vertical distance corresponds to the same percentage return 
regardless of the time period considered).  This striking graph shows that the U.S. equity market 
has been a remarkably reliable source of investment return from the mid-1930s to the mid-2000s, 
yielding an uninterrupted and nearly linear log-cumulative-growth curve over these seven 
decades.  This period, which followed the Great Depression, should be called the “Great 
Modulation” because of the stability that characterized financial markets during this time.2
 
  
While there were certainly some sizable ups and downs over this time span, from the perspective 
of an investor with a 10- to 20-year horizon, investing in a well-diversified portfolio of U.S. 
equities would have generated comparable average returns and volatility over almost any point 
throughout this 70-year period.   
 
Figure 1.  Semi-logarithmic plot of cumulative total return of CRSP value-weighted return index 
from January 1926 to December 2010, and standard plot of the total number of stocks used in the 
index.  Source: CRSP and author’s calculations. 
 
In such a stable financial environment, assumptions (A1)–(A6) do yield reasonable 
approximations; hence it is not surprising that the traditional investment paradigm of a linear 
                                                 
2 This term also refers to both economic and regulatory reforms that were put in place in the wake of the Great 
Depression to modulate financial activity, including much of the U.S. code that now governs the entire financial 
system: the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, the Banking Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.  The Great 
Modulation should not be confused with the “Great Moderation”, a term coined by Stock and Watson (2002) that 
refers to the 1987–2007 period of lower volatility in the U.S. business cycle.  The two concepts are clearly related. 
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risk/reward trade-off, passive buy-and-hold index funds, and 60/40 asset-allocation heuristics 
emerged and became popular during this period.  The more pressing issue at hand is whether the 
most recent decade can be ignored as a temporary anomaly—the exception that proves the rule—
or if it is a harbinger of a new world order.  There is mounting evidence that supports the latter 
conclusion. 
A New World Order 
Although every generation of investors is likely to consider its own environment unique 
and special, with several unprecedented features and innovations, there are objective reasons to 
believe that the environment of the last decade is significantly different from that of the seven 
decades prior.  One obvious indication is volatility, something all investors have become 
painfully aware of over the past few years.  Figure 2 depicts the annualized volatility of daily 
CRSP value-weighted index returns over trailing 125-day windows, a measure of short-term 
volatility.  This graph shows that the aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash was an extremely 
volatile period, which was followed by the decades of the Great Modulation when volatility was 
considerably more muted.  However, the highest-volatility period occurred not during the Great 
Depression, but much more recently, during the fourth quarter of 2008 in the wake of the 
Lehman bankruptcy.  Other market statistics such as trading volume, market capitalization, 
trade-execution times, and the sheer number of listed securities and investors point to a similar 
conclusion: today’s equity markets are larger, faster, and more diverse than at any other time in 
modern history.  We are living in genuinely unusual times. 
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Figure 2.  125-day rolling-window annualized volatility of CRSP daily value-weighted return 
index, from January 2, 1926 to December 31, 2010.  Source: CRSP and author’s calculations. 
 
This pattern may well be a reflection of a much broader trend: population growth.  
Figure 3 depicts the estimated world population from 10,000 B.C. to the present in logarithmic 
scale, and as with U.S. equities, this series also exhibits exponential growth (of course, the two 
phenomena are not unrelated).3
                                                 
3 World population data is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s International Data Base.  The U.S. Census 
Bureau reports several sources for world population estimates from 10,000 B.C. to 1950, some of which include 
lower and upper estimates; I average these estimates to yield a single estimate for each year in which figures are 
available.  From 1951 to 2011, the U.S. Census Bureau provides a unique estimate per year.  For further details, 
please see http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/worldhis.php. 
  Figure 3 shows three distinct periods of human population 
growth over the last 12 millennia: low growth during the Stone Age from 10,000 B.C. to 4,000 
B.C., moderate growth from the start of the Bronze Age around 4,000 B.C. to the industrial 
revolution in the 1800s, and much faster growth since then.  In 1900, the world population was 
estimated to be approximately 1.5 billion individuals (the red dot); the most recent estimate puts 
current world population at 7 billion (the green dot).  Within the space of a century, we have 
more than quadrupled the number of inhabitants on this planet, and the vast majority of these 
individuals must work to survive and will therefore engage in some form of life-cycle savings 
and investment activity during their lifetimes.  This naturally increases the required scale of 
financial markets as well as the complexity of the interactions among the various counterparties.   
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Figure 3.  Semi-logarithmic plot of estimated world population from 10,000 B.C. to 2011 A.D..  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (International Data Base) and author’s calculation. 
 
This dramatic increase in human population is no accident, but is a direct consequence of 
technological innovation that has allowed us to manipulate our environment and natural 
resources to meet and, ultimately, greatly exceed our subsistence needs.  Advances in 
agricultural, medical, manufacturing, transportation, information, and financial technologies 
have all contributed to this extraordinary run of reproductive success by Homo sapiens.  These 
advances are largely the result of competitive economic forces by which innovation is richly 
rewarded, and through which recent innovations quickly become obsolete.  This has led to a far 
different world today than the world of just a few decades ago.  One of the most compelling 
illustrations of this difference is the pair of graphs in Figures 4a and b, which display the 
population size, per-capita GDP, and average life expectancy of various countries at two points 
in time, respectively: 1939 and 2009.  In 1939, the United States—the large yellow disc at the 
upper-right range of Figure 4a—was in an enviable position, with one of the highest levels of 
per-capita GDP and life expectancy among the major industrialized countries of the world, and 
only a handful of close competitors.   
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 (a) (b) 
Figure 4.  Population, per-capita GDP, and life expectancy for countries of the world in: (a) 1939; 
and (b) 2009.  Source: http://gapminder.org. 
 
However, Figure 4b tells a very different story: a mere six decades later, the U.S. is no 
longer the only dominant economic force in the global economy.  We are now surrounded by 
many sizable competitors, including Japan (the largest red disc closest to the U.S.) and Europe 
(the many orange discs to the left of the U.S.).  And the two most populous countries in the 
world—China (the largest red disc) and India (the largest light-blue disc)—have had enormous 
impact on global trade patterns, labor supply, relative wages and production costs, foreign 
exchange rates, and innovation and productivity in just the last 20 years.  Given these seismic 
economic shifts, is it any wonder that the dynamics of global financial asset prices, which must 
ultimately reflect the supply and demand of real assets, have become less stable in recent years?  
The Great Modulation is giving way to a new world order. 
The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis 
These large-scale economic changes and their political and cultural consequences are the 
ultimate reasons that assumptions (A1)–(A6) have become less plausible in the current 
environment, and why financial market dynamics are so different today than they were during 
the Great Modulation.  Technological advances are often accompanied by unintended 
consequences, including pollution, global warming, flu pandemics, and, of course, financial 
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crises.  Financial technology in particular has been a double-edged sword.  It has facilitated 
tremendous global economic growth over the past decade by gathering and channeling vast 
amounts of capital from asset owners from one part of the world to entrepreneurs in other parts 
of the world who are able to make better use of it.  But globally connected capital markets imply 
that local financial shocks will propagate more quickly to other regions, as we have seen with the 
recent financial crisis and the spillover effects of the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis. 
This new world order is the context in which the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH) 
has emerged as a more complete explanation of the behavior of financial markets and their 
participants.4  The AMH begins with the recognition that human behavior is a complex 
combination of multiple decision-making systems, of which logical reasoning is only one among 
several.  The ability to engage in abstract thought, to communicate these thoughts to others, and 
to act in a coordinated fashion to achieve complex goals seem to be uniquely human traits that 
have allowed us to dominate our environment like no other species, ushering in the age of Homo 
economicus (at least according to economists).  Neuroscientists have traced these abilities to a 
region of the brain known as the “neocortex”, an anatomical structure that is unique to mammals 
and is particularly large and densely connected in Homo sapiens.5
However, before humans developed these impressive faculties for abstraction, we still 
managed to survive in a hostile and competitive world, thanks to more primitive decision-making 
mechanisms.  One example is the fight-or-flight response, a series of near-instantaneous 
physiological reactions to physical threats that include: increased blood pressure and blood flow 
to the large muscle groups; the constriction of blood vessels in other parts of the body; rapid 
release of nutrients such as glucose into the bloodstream; decreased appetite, digestive activity, 
and sexual desire; tunnel vision and loss of hearing; and much faster reflexes.
  On an evolutionary timescale, 
the neocortex is the most recent component of the brain, hence its name.  
6
                                                 
4 See Lo (2004, 2005) and Brennan and Lo (2011) for more detailed expositions of the Adaptive Markets 
Hypothesis. 
  In short, the 
fight-or-flight response prepares us to defend ourselves from attack by either evading our 
attacker or fighting to the death.  This complex collection of decisions is not made voluntarily 
and after careful deliberation, but is a “hardwired” automatic response in most animal species; if 
5 See Schoenemann (2006) for a review of the literature on human brain evolution and a comparison of 
subcomponents of the brain across hominid species. 
6 See de Becker (1997), Zajonc (1980, 1984), and Lo (2011). 
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we had to think about whether to react in this manner, we would end up as dinner for less 
pensive predators. 
The key insight regarding these various decision-making mechanisms is that they are not 
completely independent.  In some cases, such as the fight-or-flight response, they work together 
to achieve a single purpose: a physiological reaction involving several systems that are typically 
independent but which become highly correlated under specific circumstances.7
However, from a financial decision-making perspective, this reaction can be highly 
counter-productive.  Adaptations like the fight-or-flight response emerged in response to 
physical threats, not financial losses, yet our instinctive response to both is much the same.  The 
behavioral biases that psychologists and behavioral economists have documented are simply 
adaptations that have been taken out of their evolutionary context:  fight-or-flight is an extremely 
effective decision-making system in a street fight, but potentially disastrous in a financial crisis.
  However, such 
coordination sometimes implies that certain decision-making components take priority over 
others.  For example, Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice (1994) document many instances in 
which extreme emotional reaction can “short circuit” logical deliberation, inhibiting activity in 
the neocortex.  From an evolutionary standpoint, this makes perfect sense—emotional reactions 
are a call to arms that should be heeded immediately because survival may depend on it, and 
higher brain functions such as language and logical reasoning are suppressed until the threat is 
over, i.e., until the emotional reaction subsides.  When being chased by a tiger, it is more 
advantageous to be frightened into scrambling up a tree than to be able to solve differential 
equations! 
8
The focus of the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis is not on any single behavior, but rather 
on how behavior responds to changing market conditions.  In the framework of the AMH, 
individuals are neither perfectly rational nor completely irrational, but are intelligent, forward-
looking, competitive investors who adapt to new economic realities.  When John Maynard 
Keynes was criticized for flip-flopping on the gold standard, he is said to have replied, “When 
 
                                                 
7 It is no coincidence that the all-too-familiar pattern of abruptly increasing correlations of previously uncorrelated 
activities exists in physiological phenomena as well as in financial time series—fight-or-flight responses can trigger 
flights-to-safety. 
8 See Lo (2011) for a more detailed discussion of the neurosciences perspective on financial crises, and Brennan and 
Lo (2011) for an evolutionary framework in which various behavioral regularities such as risk aversion, loss 
aversion, and probability matching emerge quite naturally through the forces of natural selection. 
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the facts change, sir, I change my mind; what do you do?”  By modeling the change in behavior 
as a function of the environment in which investors find themselves, it becomes clear that 
efficient and irrational markets are two extremes, neither of which fully captures the state of the 
market at any point in time. 
In fact, human responses to risk are more subtle than the fight-or-flight mechanism might 
imply.  One striking illustration is the “Peltzman effect”, named after the University of Chicago 
economist Sam Peltzman.  In a controversial empirical study on the impact of government 
regulations requiring the use of automobile safety devices such as seat belts, Peltzman (1975) 
concluded that these regulations did little to reduce the number of highway deaths because 
people adjusted their behavior accordingly, presumably driving faster and more recklessly.  
Although in certain cases, the number of fatalities among the occupants of autos involved in 
accidents did decline over time, his analysis showed that this decline was almost entirely offset 
by an increase in the number of pedestrian deaths and nonfatal accidents.  He concluded that the 
benefits of safety regulations were mostly negated by changes in driver behavior. Since then, 
many studies have extended Peltzman’s original study by considering additional safety devices 
such as airbags, anti-lock brakes, crumple zones, etc.  In some cases these new studies have 
confirmed, but in other cases they have refuted, Peltzman’s original findings after controlling for 
other factors such as enforcement practices, driver age, rural vs. urban roads, vehicle weight, and 
so on.9
These mixed results are not surprising given the many different contexts in which we 
drive automobiles.  While a harried commuter might well take advantage of improved safety by 
driving faster and getting to work a few minutes earlier, the same does not apply to visiting 
tourists.  However, in a recent study of the Peltzman effect, Sobel and Nesbit (2007) investigate 
the one driving context in which there are very few confounding factors, and where there is no 
doubt that all drivers are singularly focused on arriving at their final destination as quickly as 
possible: NASCAR races.  Their conclusion: “Our results clearly support the existence of 
offsetting behavior in NASCAR—drivers do drive more recklessly in response to the increased 
safety of their automobiles”.  When the only goal is to reduce driving time, it seems perfectly 
rational that increased safety would induce drivers to drive faster.  From a financial perspective, 
 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Crandall and Graham (1984), Farmer et al. (1997), and Cohen and Einav (2003). 
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this is completely consistent with basic portfolio theory: if an asset’s volatility declines but its 
expected return remains unchanged, investors will put more money into such an asset, other 
things (like correlations to other assets) equal.   
But what if safety improvements are perceived to be more effective than they are?  Then 
individuals may end up taking more risk than they intended to, simply because they feel safer 
than they really are.  Risk perception may differ from risk reality, and this was obviously a 
critical factor in the recent financial crisis.  Given the AAA ratings of CDOs and the relatively 
short and default-free history of these new securities, investors may have thought they were safer 
than, in fact, they were.10
Practical Implications 
  It is easy to see how the adaptive nature of human risk preferences can 
generate asset bubbles and market crashes.  This is one of the most important motivations for 
producing and publicizing accurate, objective, and timely risk analytics in financial contexts—
negative feedback loops are one of Nature’s most reliable mechanisms for maintaining stability 
or “homeostasis”.  The aggregation of these individual behavioral dynamics explains why 
markets are never completely efficient or irrational—they are simply adaptive. 
Although in its infancy, the AMH offers at least five immediate practical implications for 
investors, portfolio managers, and policymakers.  Perhaps the most important implication from 
an investment management perspective is that the trade-off between risk and reward is not stable 
over time or circumstances, but varies as a function of the population of market participants and 
the business environment in which they are immersed.  During periods of market dislocation—
when fear rules the day—investors will reduce their holdings of risky assets and move into safer 
investments.  This will have the effect of reducing the average return on risky assets and 
increasing the average return on safer ones, exactly the opposite of what rational finance 
predicts: the “madness of mobs” replaces the wisdom of crowds.  However, during more 
                                                 
10 However, even in this case, the wisdom of crowds suggested an important difference between CDOs and other 
securities with identical credit ratings.  For example, in an April 2006 publication by the Financial Times (Senior, 
2006), Cian O’Carroll, European head of structured products at Fortis Investments, explained why CDOs were in 
such high demand: “You buy a AA-rated corporate bond you get paid Libor plus 20 basis points; you buy a AA-
rated CDO and you get Libor plus 110 basis points”.  Did investors wonder why CDOs bonds were offering 90 basis 
points of additional yield, or where that extra yield might have been coming from?  It may not have been the 
disciples of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis that were misled during these frothy times, but more likely those who 
were convinced they had discovered a free lunch. 
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“normal” periods in which market conditions are benign, i.e., when price fluctuations are within 
historically observed ranges and current events have no overriding consequences for market 
valuations or the conduct of business, assumptions (A1)–(A6) are good approximations to reality 
and the wisdom of crowds returns.   
If, over an extended period of time, the wisdom of crowds is more common than the 
madness of mobs—as theory and empirical evidence seem to suggest—then statistical averages 
over long horizons, e.g., market risk premia, will largely reflect the wisdom of crowds.  
However, this observation does not imply that the wisdom of crowds must hold at every point in 
time.  There may be periods of collective fear or greed when the madness of mobs takes over, not 
unlike the notion of “punctuated equilibria” in evolutionary biology when, after long periods of 
evolutionary stasis, relatively sudden changes lead to extinctions and new species in their 
aftermath.11
This dynamic can be observed in the historical data, as Table 1 and Figure 5 illustrate.  
Table 1 reports the historical means and standard deviations of stocks and bonds from January 
1926 to December 2010, which confirms the traditional view that there is a positive risk/reward 
trade-off.  However, Figure 5 depicts 1,250-day (approximately five-year) rolling-window 
geometrically compounded returns and standard deviations of daily CRSP value-weighted index 
returns, which indicates a time-varying and often negative relationship between the two; the 
correlation between these two daily series is −59.9%!   
  It is precisely during such periods in financial history that bubbles and crashes 
emerge, and assumptions (A1)–(A6) become less accurate approximations to reality. 
This empirical anomaly was first documented by Fischer Black (1972), who explained it 
as a “leverage effect”: when equity prices decline (generating negative returns), this implies 
higher equity volatility because corporations with debt in their capital structure are now more 
highly leveraged.  This explanation seems eminently plausible, except that this so-called leverage 
effect is still present and even stronger among all-equity-financed companies (Hasanhodzic and 
Lo, 2010).  The AMH provides an alternate explanation: sudden increases in equity volatility 
cause a significant portion of investors to reduce their equity holdings rapidly through a fight-or-
flight response, better known in financial contexts as a “flight-to-safety”.  This process of 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Eldredge and Gould (1972).  This reference to punctuated equilibrium is not merely an 
analogy—it is meant to apply quite literally to financial institutions and economic relationships, which are subject to 
evolutionary forces in their own right. 
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divestment puts downward pressure on equity prices and upward pressure on the prices of safer 
assets, causing the normally positive association between risk and reward to be temporarily 
violated.  Once these emotional responses subside, the madness of mobs is replaced by the 
wisdom of crowds and the usual risk/reward relation is restored. 
Asset Class
Geometric 
Mean (%)
Arithmetic 
Mean (%)
Standard 
Deviation (%)
Small Company Stocks 12.1        16.7        32.6        
Large Company Stocks 9.9        11.9        20.4        
Long-Term Corporate Bonds 5.9        6.2        8.3        
Long-Term Government Bonds 5.5        5.9        9.5        
Intermediate-Term Government Bonds 5.4        5.5        5.7        
U.S. Treasury Bills 3.6        3.7        3.1        
 
Table 1.  Summary statistics of long-term stock and bond returns, from January 1926 to December 
2010.  Source: Ibbotson (2011, Table 2–1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  1250-day rolling-window annualized volatility and geometric compound returns of 
daily CRSP value-weighted return index from March 19, 1930 to December 31, 2010.  Source: 
CRSP and author’s calculations. 
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The second implication of the AMH is that market efficiency is not an all-or-nothing 
condition but a continuum, one that depends on the relative proportion of market participants 
who are making investment decisions with their prefrontal cortexes versus their more instinctive 
faculties such as fight-or-flight.  In other words, the degree of market efficiency should be 
measured, similar to the energy efficiency of an air conditioner or a hot-water heater, and is 
directly related to the degree to which a given set of market participants are adapted to the 
environment in which the market has developed.  A relatively new market is likely to be less 
efficient than a market that has been in existence for decades, but even in the latter case, 
inefficiencies can arise if either the environment shifts or the population of investors changes 
materially.  In fact, market efficiency can be measured and managed, as many securities 
exchanges do routinely as part of their ongoing efforts to improve market quality.  This 
perspective implies that assumptions (A1)–(A6) should not be viewed as either true or false, but 
rather as approximations that may become more or less accurate as market conditions and 
investor populations change. 
This observation leads to a third implication of the AMH, which is that investment 
policies must be formulated with these changes in mind, and should adapt accordingly.  When 
assumptions (A1)–(A6) are reasonable approximations to current conditions, traditional 
investment approaches are adequate, but when those assumptions break down, perhaps because 
of periods of extreme fear or greed, the traditional approaches may no longer be as effective.  
One obvious example is the notion of diversification.  Diversifying one’s investments across 500 
individual securities—for example, the stocks in the S&P 500—used to be sufficient to produce 
relatively stable and attractive returns over extended periods of time.  However, in today’s 
environment, these 500 securities are so tightly coupled in their behavior that they offer much 
lower diversification benefits than in the past.  The principle of diversification is not wrong; it is 
simply harder to achieve in today’s macro-factor-driven markets.  Therefore, its implementation 
must be adapted to the current environment, e.g., diversifying across a broader array of 
investments in multiple countries, and according to factor exposures instead of or in addition to 
asset classes. 
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A fourth implication of the AMH involves an important consequence of competition, 
innovation, and natural selection in financial markets: the transformation of alpha.  Under (A1)–
(A6), alpha should always equal 0.  Under the AMH, alpha can be positive from time to time, but 
any unique and profitable investment opportunity will eventually be adopted by many investors, 
in which case the alpha will either be reduced to 0, or it will reach an equilibrium level in which 
the risks associated with its exploitation are sufficient to limit the number of willing participants 
to some finite and sustainable number.  This is one possible explanation of the relatively stable 
risk/reward trade-off of U.S. equities during the Great Modulation, and why that trade-off seems 
to have changed in recent years as greater consolidation among asset owners due to economies of 
scale and scope, and mounting pressure in low-yield environments to find new sources of 
expected return, have intensified global competition across all financial markets and strategies.  
More striking examples can be found in the hedge-fund industry (see Lo, 2010, and Getmansky, 
Lee, and Lo, 2012), the “Galapagos islands” of the financial sector where evolution is apparent 
to the naked eye and alphas decay rapidly, only to reappear a few years later after enough 
investors and managers have moved on to greener pastures. 
Finally, the AMH has a significantly different implication for asset allocation than the 
traditional investment paradigm.  Under the stable environment of assumptions (A1)–(A6), 
simple asset-allocation rules such as a static 60/40 stock/bond portfolio might suffice.  But if 
there is significant volatility of volatility, and risk premia also vary over time, then defining 
portfolios in terms of the usual asset-based portfolio weights may not be very useful from a 
decision-making perspective.  In particular, a 60% asset weight in equities may yield a volatility 
of 0.6 × 0.20 = 12% during normal times, but during the fourth quarter of 2008, when the VIX 
reached 80%, such an allocation would have yielded a volatility of approximately 48%.  Given 
that investors are usually more concerned with risk and reward rather than the numerical values 
of their portfolio weights, the AMH suggests that denominating asset allocations in risk units 
may be more useful and more stable, particularly when (A1)–(A6) break down.  For example, if 
an investor is comfortable with an annualized return volatility of 10% for his entire portfolio, this 
can be the starting point of an asset-allocation strategy in which a risk budget of 10% is allocated 
across several asset classes, say 5% risk to equities, 3% risk to bonds, and 1% risk to 
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commodities.12  As the volatilities and correlations of the underlying assets change over time, the 
portfolio weights change in tandem to maintain constant risk weights and portfolio volatility, 
reducing the potential for fight-or-flight responses because the investor experiences fewer 
surprises with respect to his portfolio’s realized risk levels.13
Specifying risk allocations has the added benefit that during periods of heightened 
volatility, exposures to risky assets will be reduced so as to maintain comparable levels of 
volatility; recall that these periods are precisely when the madness of mobs is most likely to 
emerge, causing the expected returns of risky assets to decline due to flight-to-safety divesting.  
In the traditional investment paradigm, it never pays to engage in such “tactical” shifts because 
market timing has been shown to be virtually impossible and, therefore, ineffective, and by 
reducing exposure to risky assets from time to time, a portfolio will forgo the risk premia 
associated with those risky assets.  This misleading conclusion provides the starkest contrast 
between the EMH and AMH—if risk premia and volatilities are constant through time then static 
portfolio weights may indeed be adequate, but if they vary over time in response to observable 
market conditions, then an adaptive strategy may be superior. 
   
Risk-denominated portfolio weights are only part of the solution to the asset-allocation 
problem under the AMH; the impact of time-varying expected returns and correlations of 
individual asset classes, which may be quite different under various market regimes, must also be 
taken into account.  A more integrated approach is to use adaptive statistical estimators for all the 
                                                 
12 The fact that the volatilities of the individual components do not add up to 10% is not a typographical error; it is a 
deliberate reminder that the return volatility of a portfolio is not the sum of the volatilities of the individual 
components (due both to correlations among the assets and the nonlinearity of the square-root function).  Moreover, 
cash is also an investable asset but because its nominal returns have zero volatility, cash investments will not appear 
in any risk budget despite their importance for managing portfolio volatility.  Therefore, the notion of a “risk 
budget” must be used with caution so as not to mislead or confuse investors. 
13 This asset-allocation strategy may seem like “portfolio insurance” and related dynamic asset-allocation strategies 
(Black and Pérold, 1992; Pérold and Sharpe, 1995), but there are several important differences.  The motivation for 
risk-denominated asset-allocation (RDAA) strategies is the nonstationarity of risk levels due to behavioral 
responses; portfolio insurance typically assumes stationary returns.  Changes in portfolio weights from RDAA 
strategies are driven by changes in short-term volatility; changes in portfolio weights from portfolio-insurance 
strategies are driven by short-term losses.  And finally, the amount of time-variation in the portfolio weights of 
RDAA strategies is determined by the volatility of volatility—if volatility is relatively stable, then RDAA-strategy 
weights will be relatively smooth; the time-variation in portfolio-insurance-strategy weights is determined by the 
level of volatility—higher volatility will require more frequent portfolio rebalancing.  Of course, the two types of 
strategies will likely yield positively correlated return streams because losses are usually accompanied by increased 
volatility (Black, 1976; Hasanhodzic and Lo, 2010), hence RDAA and portfolio-insurance strategies may be 
changing risk levels at approximately the same times.  However, the magnitude and frequency of those changes are 
not the same and are driven by different variables, so the correlation will not be perfect and the ultimate risk/reward 
profiles of the two types of strategies can be quite different. 
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relevant parameters of an investor’s environment and construct allocations that incorporate 
estimation error, regime shifts, institutional changes, and more realistic models of investor 
preferences and behavior.  Such an approach has the added advantage that in stable 
environments, truly adaptive portfolio policies will eventually reduce to traditional static ones, 
implying little cost in implementing adaptive strategies during normal periods and significant 
benefits during market dislocations. 
The practical implementation of the AMH is clearly more challenging than the simpler 
heuristics of the traditional investment paradigm.  However, these challenges are considerably 
less daunting today given the vast improvements in trading technology, automated execution 
algorithms, lower trading costs, better statistical measures of time-varying parameters using 
various online data sources, the greater liquidity of exchange-traded index futures and other 
derivative securities, and better educated investors and portfolio managers.  Nevertheless, the 
increased complexity of today’s investment environment is undeniable.  It is a reflection not just 
of recent financial crises, but of a much larger and more complex global economy to which we 
must learn to adapt by applying more effective financial technologies. 
Conclusion 
There is a well-known parable about five monks who, blind from birth, encounter an 
elephant for the very first time and are later asked to describe it.  The monk who felt the 
elephant’s trunk insists that an elephant is just like a snake, the monk who felt the elephant’s leg 
claims that an elephant is just like a tree, and so on.  Their individual perspectives are not wrong, 
but they each possess an incomplete understanding of the animal.  Under stable, stationary, and 
predictable economic conditions, markets generally work well and the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis serves as a reasonably good approximation to reality; under more dynamic and 
stochastic environments, the EMH becomes less plausible and behavioral regularities seem to 
emerge.  The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis provides an integrated and logically consistent 
framework for reconciling these disparate perspectives, and offers several practical insights with 
respect to investing in the current economic climate of uncertainty and market turmoil.  Of 
course, the AMH is not yet as well developed as the EMH, but this is changing as we begin to 
collect more relevant data for measuring the evolutionary dynamics of financial markets and 
investor behavior across time and circumstances.  The early evidence suggests that the AMH can 
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explain not only departures from the EMH and behavioral regularities, but also how markets 
shift from the wisdom of crowds to the madness of mobs and back again.14
  
  By studying the 
forces behind such changes, we can begin to develop more effective models for managing our 
investments and come closer to the ultimate goal of efficiently allocating scarce resources to 
support steady economic growth while maintaining financial stability. 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Brennan and Lo (2011, 2012), Getmansky, Lee, and Lo (2012), and Lo (2010, 2011). 
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